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Tender Offers, Lock-ups and the Williams Act: A
Critical Analysis of Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that certain "lock-up" agree-
ments between a tender offeror and the target corporation which
are intended to, and do, effectively eliminate competitive market
bidding for the target's shares in a corporate takeover struggle are
prohibited by the Williams Act.2 With the ever-increasing popular-
ity of the cash tender offer as a method of corporate acquisition,3
and the resultant need of corporate target management to formu-
late appropriate responses to takeover attempts, the Marathon
decision is cause for much concern in the corporate community, for
it potentially precludes target management from utilizing an effec-
tive defensive procedure.
The "tender offer" or "takeover bid" is a method of acquiring an
interest in a target corporation, in which an acquiror publicly of-
fers to purchase, or solicits offers to sell, all or a portion of the
securities of a publicly held corporation.5 The tender offer is fre-
quently the first step toward obtaining control of the target, and is
often followed by a liquidating merger.'
Target managers have developed a wide variety of techniques to
combat takeover attempts considered to be hostile.7 One alterna-
tive available to the target involves the active solicitation by its
management of a friendly acquiror, or "white knight," who it is
1. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Williams Act
Amendments added several subsections dealing with tender offers to § 13 and § 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
3. See Comment, Cash Tender Offers in the Corporate Supermarket, 10 CuM. L. REV.
93, 94 & n.7 (1979).
4. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 901 (1979).
5. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973).
6. Steinberger, Corporate Takeovers - Cash Tender Offers, Exchange Offers, and
Target Defense, in 1 BusiNEss AcQuIsrrMONs 597, 597 (J. Hertz & C. Bailer 2d ed. 1981).
7. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 901-02; Note, Defensive Tactics Employed
by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104 (1969).
See also infra note 25.
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hoped will win a bidding contest with the unwanted competitor.8
In order to facilitate such friendly takeover bids, so-called lock-up
devices are occasionally employed. A lock-up typically involves the
sale of, or grant of an option to purchase stock or capital assets of
the target corporation to the white knight tender offeror, and is
intended to give the preferred corporate suitor a significant com-
petitive advantage over other potential acquirors9
Assessment of the validity of the "locked-up white knight" re-
sponse requires a two step analysis. Initially, in determining
whether to oppose or support any tender offer, target management
must observe its fiduciary duty to its shareholders.10 Because the
tender offer is often employed in an effort to shift control of the
target corporation to the acquiror, and because this method of ac-
quisition involves open market transactions in the target's securi-
ties, a number of competing interests are implicated, each having
an effect upon target management's response.
Target management may oppose the takeover because it hon-
estly does not believe that the takeover is in the best interests of
the corporation or its shareholders. Opposition may also result
simply from management's desire to preserve its position of power
and income. The target shareholder, on the other hand, may wish
to maximize the value of his, investment regardless of who actually
controls the target corporation.11 Although management may de-
sire to perpetuate itself in office, it is constrained by its fiduciary
obligations to act only in the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders.'2
Once target management has determined to oppose the takeover
attempt, it must ensure that steps taken toward this end, such as
executing lock-up agreements with a white knight, do not violate
the Williams Act.'" The Act, among other things, proscribes per-
sons from engaging in any "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices in connection with a tender offer" or solicitation
against it.'4 In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., the Sixth Circuit
8. See Note, supra note 7, at 1126-27.
9. Nathan, Lock-ups and Leg-ups: The Search for Security in the Acquisitions Mar-
ketplace, 13 ANN. INST. ON SEc. REG. 13, 69-70 (1981).
10. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 905; Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Good-
rich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
11. See Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 991, 993-96 (1973).
12. See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
14. Williams Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) provides:
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held that lock-up agreements in the form of stock and capital asset
options were a manipulative device under the Act because they in-
terfered with open market competition.15
This comment will provide a critical analysis of the Marathon
decision. It will briefly describe the tender offer method of corpo-
rate acquisition and explain how lock-up agreements can be used
to facilitate or thwart these takeover attempts. Next, the Williams
Act will be analyzed and its applicability to lock-up devices ques-
tioned. In connection with this inquiry, the Marathon opinion will
be reviewed and analyzed in light of the Act's legislative origins,
policy concerns, and relationship to the state law of corporate
fiduciary duty.
II. TENDER OFFERS AND LoCK-UPS
A. The Tender Offer
Understanding of the implications of the Marathon decision re-
quires familiarity with the tender offer method of corporate acqui-
sition. A "tender offer" or "takeover bid" is a method of acquiring
shares in a "target corporation" in which a company, an individual,
or a group of persons makes a public offer or solicitation to
purchase, during a fixed period of time, all or a portion of a class
or classes of stock of a publicly held corporation at a specified
price or upon specified terms for cash, securities, or both.16 Such
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading or to en-
gage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of secur-
ity holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. 669 F.2d at 374-77.
16. See E. ARANow & H. EINHoRN, supra note 5, at 69-70, where the authors explain
that the meaning of the term "tender offer" as used in the context of the Williams Act is
incapable of precise determination, but that the definition given in the text represents the
term's generally accepted meaning:
Neither the Williams Act nor the rules adopted by the Commission pursuant thereto
attempt to define a "tender offer." However, the failure of both the Congress and the
Commission to define the term reflects neither oversight nor a tacit acknowledgment
that the term has acquired a generic meaning which is universally recognized. In-
stead, the absence of a definition apparently derives from the fact that the Congress
and the Commission were of the view that a tender offer for purposes of the federal
regulatory scheme may well encompass transactions yet unborn which are not consid-
ered tender offers in general custom and usage. Thus the question of just what is
encompassed by the term tender offer has been intentionally left open, in an ostensi-
ble effort to preserve the flexibility of both the Commission and the courts in making
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offers may be made for a number of purposes and for any percent-
age of the target's outstanding stock, although they are frequently
designed to obtain control of the target.1 7 Tender offers made di-
rectly to shareholders permit acquisition of the target without the
necessity of complying with state laws governing other forms of ac-
quisitions, such as mergers, consolidations, or sales of assets; of
management approval; and of submission to a vote of the target's
shareholders."8 A tender offer may also be used in a friendly trans-
action where the offer is negotiated directly with target manage-
ment, who then recommends acceptance to the shareholders.
These offers are frequently followed by a merger with the offering
entity.'
The primary appeal of the tender offer, as opposed to other ac-
quisition techniques, is cost savings.20 The fundamental expense of
the tender offer is the price paid for the shares of the target corpo-
ration. To attract tenderors, the offered price will necessarily in-
clude a premium above the target securities' current trading
value.21 However, the acquiror need only purchase that portion of
shares of the target corporation necessary to gain control, from
which a merger might later follow."2 Mergers or sales of assets, on
the other hand, require the acquiror to pay for all of the target's
assets. Often, the tender offeror is also able to avoid the costly and
time-consuming negotiations with target management that are as-
sociated with these other acquisition forms."3
a determination on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
17. See Steinberger, supra note 6, at 597.
18. Id.
19. Id. Tender offers also have been used for non-takeover purposes. For example,
corporations have employed this device as a means of repurchasing their own securities.
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 HAnv. L. Ray. 1250, 1253 (1973).
20. See Note, Regulation of Tender Offers, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 911, 911-12.
21. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 317, 319 (1967). This additional cost may also reflect the taxable nature of the trans-
action. Id.
22. See Note, supra note 20, at 912. Some of the advantages of the tender offer tech-
nique may be diminished when a merger is later consummated. However, many of the disad-
vantages of a subsequent merger transaction can be avoided if the tender offeror is success-
ful in obtaining a sufficient number of shares to allow for a short form merger. Fleischer &
Mundheim, supra note 21, at 319 & n.10. See generally Comment, The Short Merger Stat-
ute, 32 U. CHI. L. Rav. 596 (1965).
23. See Note, supra note 20, at 912. In preparing for a tender offer, the prospective
acquiror will incur costs associated with retaining a "team of specialists" which should in-
clude "a lawyer, an investment banker, a professional 'proxy' solicitor, and a network of
soliciting banks, trust companies, and securities dealers." E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra
672 Vol. 21:669
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In contested takeover situations, the tender offer may be the
only realistic option available to the acquiror. The would-be suitor
is precluded from consummating a merger or purchase of the tar-
get's assets because it will be unable to procure the necessary ap-
proval of target management. Further, the acquiror's only alterna-
tive, the proxy contest, is less satisfactory because such overtures
can be prohibitively expensive and are frequently unsuccessful.24
Ideally, an acquiror should seek to locate a prospective target in
which management is friendly, or at a minimum, not actively op-
posed to the offeror's bid. This is because the tender offer tech-
nique, when employed in noncontested acquisitions, is potentially
the most cost effective takeover device available. The elimination
of target management opposition may result in the completion of
the tender offer at a lower price-per-share, in addition to facilitat-
ing the ultimate success of the takeover.15
B. Lock-ups: The Offeror's Perspective
With the proliferation of tender offers, the acquisitions market
has witnessed the development of various techniques designed to
enhance the prospect that an offer will succeed. Included in this
category are the so-called lock-up mechanisms. The term "lock-
up" refers generally to a device employed by acquiring companies
for the purpose of protecting their acquisition attempts by discour-
aging, impeding, or preventing competitive offers by another cor-
porate suitor." In addition, lock-ups provide time for the acquiror
to investigate the target and for planning for the structure of the
acquisition transaction or for tax-free treatment for the target's
shareholders. Again, these goals are achieved by lessening the pos-
note 5, at 10. The offeror may also require the services of a certified public accountant, a
public relations expert, and several banks who will effectuate the transfer of shares from the
tendering shareholders to the offeror. Id.
24. See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 21, at 320-21.
25. Id. at 318. Target opposition frequently forces an increase in the tender offer price.
Id. at 323. Incumbent management is a potent force to be reckoned with in any takeover
attempt. As one observer has noted:
Management is by no means defenseless in the face of a tender offer. An imposing
array of defensive maneuvers designed to preserve management's control position has
developed in response to the recent widespread use of the tender offer by acquisition-
minded companies. In general, these maneuvers operate either prophylactically, to
diminish the likelihood of a takeover bid, or remedially, to frustrate the success of a
bid already in progress. Skillfully utilized, they can provide incumbent management
with a powerful tactical advantage in a contest for control.
Note, supra note 7, at 1105.
26. Nathan, supra note 9, at 16.
1983 673
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sibility of competitive bidding for the target. Lock-ups can also
serve to decrease the likelihood that target management will have
a change of heart, whether or not a competitor appears.27
There is a variety of situations in which lock-ups can occur, and
there are a number of techniques that can be employed. The tradi-
tional lock-up device is a negotiated purchase by the acquiror of a
substantial block of the target's stock from one or more sharehold-
ers as the first step in the acquisition and prior to any public an-
nouncement .2 The effectiveness of this measure depends upon the
percentage of the target's outstanding stock that a potential ac-
quiror is able to obtain.29 A small block of shares can be of great
advantage in a tender offer bidding contest, even if it cannot com-
pletely prevent competition. Additionally, should the owner of a
block of shares lose the bidding contest, the appreciated value of
his stock should still provide him with a return that would enable
him to cover his expenses and show a modest profit.3 0
There are also advantages to the prospective acquiror who ob-
tains a strong stock position with regard to the target company.
The acquiror can bargain for a merger with the target from a posi-
tion of strength. If the target rejects the proposal for merger or
other combination, the acquiror might then decide to make a
tender offer. As a general rule, target management will prefer a
friendly merger to a hostile tender offer which appears to have
good prospects for success, because the interests of incumbent
management are more likely to be honored in a friendly merger
context. Particularly in situations where the target fears a take-
over, it may be disposed to view the prospective acquiror with a
strong stock position as a sound merger partner, and might regard
a merger as protection from hostile takeover bids."1
Similar results can be accomplished through an option agree-
ment lock-up. Rather than committing itself to purchase shares, an
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 21. See also Kramer, The Formulated Lock-Up; New Technique Emerges in
Takeover Arena, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 3, 1981, at 19, col. 3.
29. An offeror who wishes to take the target company by surprise in order to limit the
target's ability to mobilize defensively should limit his holdings to under five percent of the
target's outstanding equity securities. Persons who exceed this five percent threshold are
required, by 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981), to file Schedule 131), 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-101 (1982), in which the offeror must disclose his identity and the purpose of his
purchase.
30. Nathan, supra note 9, at 21-22. See also Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 21, at
321.
31. B. Fox & E. Fox, CoRpoRATE ACQUISMONS AND MERGERS, § 27.02 (1981).
Vol. 21:669
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acquiror obtains an option to buy them from the target's share-
holders. The option presents to the acquiror most of the advan-
tages of the stock purchase, with the added benefit of freedom
from obligatory purchase should the acquiror decide to abandon
the acquisition or renegotiate its terms. On the other hand, unless
specifically bargained for, the acquiror will not have the security of
voting power until the option is exercised. There is also the possi-
bility that the seller will fail to perform when called upon to do
SO.32 As with the stock purchase agreement, a number of legal con-
siderations influence the acquiror's decision to employ the option
technique, and the method of its utilization. 3
32. Nathan, supra note 9, at 44-45.
33. Id. Optionees who possess a right to acquire beneficial ownership of the target's
securities within 60 days are deemed to be the beneficial owners of the securities. If the
option would represent a right to acquire more than five percent of a class of the target's
stock, the holder must file a Schedule 13D. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(a), 240.13d-3(d) (1982).
See supra note 29.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. § 1505, 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(Supp. V 1981)), also applies to open market transactions and when the size criteria of the
Act are met, requires compliance with its filing and waiting period requirements before ei-
ther 15% or more than $15 million of the target's voting securities and/or assets can be
acquired, unless the transaction falls within one or more of the exemptions of the Act or the
accompanying rules of the Federal Trade Commission. The waiting period prescribed by the
Act is at least thirty days after the required notification of federal agencies is made, and is
applicable to all stock transactions which meet its jurisdictional test except cash tender
offers. As a result, stock purchase agreements and option agreements to which the Act is
applicable lose some of their effectiveness as lock-up measures. Careful planning can avoid
this obstacle, and executory purchase agreements with closings after the waiting period has
expired, and options and warrants exercisable after the close of this period can eliminate the
Act's significant impediments. See Nathan, supra note 9, at 22-25; Steinberger, supra note
6, at 604.
To be an effective lock-up tactic, stock purchase and option agreements with sharehold-
ers should also be structured so as not to constitute a tender offer within the meaning of §
14(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). Although the term "tender offer" was
not defined in the Act, its charcteristics were described in the House Report of the Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce as follows:
The offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a
company-usually at a price above the current market price. Those accepting the
offer are said to tender their stock for purchase. The person making the offer obli-
gates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered shares if certain
specified conditions are met.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2811, 2811. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 19.
The regulations promulgated under § 14 of the Act require tender offers to remain open
for a minimum of 20 business days, and also prescribe a 15 business day withdrawal period.
Furthermore, Rule 10b-13 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1982), prohibits a
bidder from purchasing target securities outside of the bidder's tender or exchange offer.
Because the primary value of the stock purchase or option agreement as a lock-up is in
avoidance of the opportunity for competition, such agreements must be drafted to avoid
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 21:669
C. Lock-ups: The Target's Perspective
Lock-up measures have been employed "defensively" by target
management in efforts designed solely to defeat an unwanted
tender offer."4 Alternatively, these same devices can be used "re-
sponsively" by target management in friendly negotiated transac-
tions, as when a company who fears an unfriendly takeover at-
tempt, or who is presently faced with one, seeks a friendly
intervenor - a white knight. In these situations, the lock-up usu-
ally involves the target company directly, and does not depend
upon shareholder action.
The most common mechanism employed to lock-up friendly
transactions involves the issuance of stock to the favored acquiror
by the target company." This method frequently involves the
grant of an option to purchase target stock in a negotiated acquisi-
tion agreement.3 6 The principal purpose of the option is to deter
coming within the purview of these rules. See Nathan, supra note 9, at 25-26. With regard
to the disclosure and anti-fraud requirements of § 14(e) as they apply to activities related to
tender offers, see infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
State takeover statutes, which often have broader applicability than does the Williams
Act, should also be consulted. See Comment, supra note 3, at 100 & n.38. However, several
state takeover statutes have been invalidated in the federal courts. See, e.g., Edgar v. Mite
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982) (Illinois); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1980) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of New Jersey statute); Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho).
34. Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
is illustrative of the defensive use of lock-ups. In Milgo, Applied Digital, after an unsuccess-
ful merger attempt, made an exchange offer to Milgo's shareholders. Milgo's management,
being opposed to the takeover, agreed to sell to Racal Electronics Ltd. 312,000 shares of
authorized but unissued stock, which represented 15.5% of Milgo's total common stock. Id.
at 1149, 1158. Coupled with the 6.5% stock ownership of Milgo management, the sale would
have placed over 20% ownership into the hands of parties hostile to the takeover, thus
severely decreasing the probability of its ultimate success. Id. at 1158. In an action to enjoin
the proposed sale, the district court held that a violation of corporate fiduciary duty would
suffice to state a cause of action under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1976), and that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing, for purposes of preliminary
injunctive relief, that there was no valid business purpose for the stock transfer and that it
had been effectuated solely to defeat Applied Digital's exchange offer. 425 F. Supp. at 1158-
61. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977), the application of fiduciary principles in construing § 14(e) of the Williams Act
seems to have been misplaced. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D.
Ill. 1982): "A mere breach of fiduciary duty does not constitute a violation of section 14(e) of
the Williams Act." Id. at 947 (citation omitted). See infra notes 117-38 and accompanying
text.
35. See Nathan, supra note 9, at 60-66, where the author asserts that this method has
become commonplace, and is often used routinely as part of merger and acquisition transac-
tions where no competitive bidding has started.
36. One of the lock-up options granted U.S. Steel by Marathon involved stock that
676
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the emergence of a rival bidder, or the continuation of a bidding
contest by a prior offeror, and to decrease the likelihood that a
competitor will acquire the desired percentage of the target's
stock. 7 To serve its deterrent purposes, the agreement is usually
well publicized.36
Another form of "responsive" lock-up involves the sale or option
of key assets of the target to the friendly bidder.39 The utility of
this mechanism derives from the belief that the hostile bidder will
lose interest in the target sans the asset.4 0 In order for this lock-up
to be effective, the asset to be sold or optioned must be a "crown
jewel" of the target.4 1 Further, the transaction must be well publi-
cized if it is to serve its purpose as a deterrent to competition. Fi-
nally, a hostile bidder must believe that the target will, in fact, sell
the key asset to the friendly bidder even after the hostile bidder
has won the bidding contest.42
was already authorized but unissued. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
37. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 934.
38. Nathan, supra note 9, at 60-62. Because publicity is desirable, compliance with the
Williams Act disclosure requirements does not undercut the utility of this mechanism. Legal
constraints do exist, however. The friendly acquiror will inevitably seek the lowest possible
price-per-share. Generally, state corporation law requires corporations to receive considera-
tion for their stock in an amount equal to the fair value of the stock. Fair value can be
established either by setting the stock purchase price in the lock-up at the market price of
the stock at the time the acquisition agreement is executed, or by setting the stock purchase
price at the acquiror's proposed price for publicly held shares. Either valuation method will
provide the acquiror with an advantageous position in the event competitive bidding stimu-
lates rapid price escalation. Id. at 65-66.
Similarly, just as a target's decision to oppose one would-be acquiror and favor another
must be made in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, see infra notes
100-15 and accompanying text, so too must its decision to issue new stock serve those inter-
ests. The issuance of stock must be for a valid corporate purpose, and not solely to further
management's desire to perpetuate itself in office. Nathan, supra note 9, at 65-66. Cf. Ap-
plied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying
business judgment test to stock issuance lock-up and imposing fiduciary obligations under
the Williams Act).
39. See, e.g., Liggett Sets Sale of Unit in Move to Bar Takeover, Wall St. J., Apr. 23,
1980, at 10, col. 1.
40. Nathan, supra note 9, at 75. This is not always the case, however, especially where
the asset is sold for its fair market value. The hostile bidder may then view the transaction
as simply a change in form but not in value of the target corporation, and might even wel-
come the resultant liquidity. On the other hand, a target wishing to divest itself of an asset
for less than market value risks challenges that the transaction served no valid corporate
purpose and was not in the best interests of shareholders. The problem becomes particularly
acute in instances where the hostile bidder prevails and the sale would result in harm to the
target's shareholders. Id. at 75-80.
41. The target may be made up of a number of relatively attractive operations, so that
the sale of one of them may not deter the hostile bidder in his acquisition attempt. Id. at 77.
42. Id. at 77-78.
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Although the impediments created by a lock-up employed in a
friendly transaction can be overcome by a persistent hostile bidder,
the decision in Marathon casts doubt upon their continued valid-
ity. An appraisal of the future of these devices in the volatile
tender offer acquisitions market requires an analysis of the Mara-
thon court's construction and application of the Williams Act in
light of the Act's purposes and against the background of com-
monly accepted fiduciary principles.
III. THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. Policy Considerations
Federal tender offer regulation is a response to the recognized
need to protect the various competing societal and private inter-
ests implicated in a takeover struggle. One commentator has iden-
tified three categories of competing private interests: those of the
offeror, those of the target corporation, and those of the target
shareholders.4 In addition, two somewhat conflicting public policy
considerations are set forth as regulatory concerns. Assessing the
applicability of the Williams Act to lock-up agreements made in
the tender offer context requires familiarity with these fundamen-
tal relationships.
An acquiring company may desire the takeover or a position of
control over the target corporation for a number of reasons. The
offeror may wish to diversify or acquire a dominant position in a
particular market, or may simply envision gains from economies of
scale. It may also view the acquisition as a bargain purchase be-
cause it perceives values in the target company which are not re-
flected in its current market price or which will follow from the
acquisition." The offeror's ultimate goal is to maximize its profits
as a result of the acquisition, and to this end it will incur consider-
able cost.45 As a result of the premium it will have to pay above the
market price if the tender offer is to succeed, an acquiror ordina-
rily will act only where the target's stock is believed to be under-
valued in the market. Target management opposition is likely
where an offer is perceived as inadequate.4"
43. See Note, supra note 11, at 993.
44. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTFIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 77 (2d ed. 1979).
45. Note, supra note 11, at 993-94 & n.15.
46. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHmmESTEIN, supra note 44, at 710. See E. ARANOW & H. EIN-
HORN, supra note 5, at 38, where the authors assert that "[a] handsome premium above
market. . . can compensate for an ineffective solicitation effort or overcome active opposi-
tion by the management of the target company, and in some instances may even influence
678 Vol. 21:669
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Once the decision has been made to proceed with the tender of-
fer, the acquiror will seek to complete it as quickly as possible. The
longer an offer remains open, the greater the opportunity for the
market price of the target's stock to rise to a level exceeding the
offered premium. This may be caused by market conditions gener-
ally, or result from the emergence of a competing tender offer. Fur-
ther, fluctuations in interest rates for offerors who must borrow to
obtain the purchase price present the danger of significant ex-
pense, which increases with the length of the offering period.' 7
When faced with a takeover bid, a number of interests may in-
fluence the target corporation's response. Incumbent management
generally will wish to maintain its position of power and income,
and if the acquiror is perceived to be inclined to install its own
management team, this position of power is threatened. Yet it
would be a mistake to attribute all management opposition to such
selfish motivations. Management might object to the takeover for
many bona fide business reasons in a legitimate effort to protect
the interests of the corporation as an economic entity, or more di-
rectly, the interests of its shareholders.'8
The third amalgam of private interests implicated by the tender
offer is that of the target shareholder. Desiring to maximize the
value of his investment, the shareholder must make several in-
formed choices. He must first decide whether to disinvest. Factors
in this decision include the difference between the market price
and the tender offer price, and the shareholder's perception of the
the position taken by the target's management with regard to the offer." Id. (footnote
omitted).
47. Note, supra note 11, at 994-95.
48. Id. at 995. Managment may object to the plans that the offeror has for the target
corporation, or oppose the takeover bid because of the target's prospects for improvement
under present management or because the target's security prices are temporarily de-
pressed. Id.
With respect to the various business reasons for which target management might legiti-
mately object to a tender offer, the Fox treatise on acquisitions is illustrative:
A takeover bid may seriously impair the morale of the management and its employ-
ees. It may if resisted ... cause disclocation of resources - both personnel and
financial, causing expenditure of vast sums of money and occupying hundreds of
management hours that might otherwise be devoted to business operations. A suc-
cessful takeover bid may, depending on the facts, result in association of the target
company with a company heavy with debt and financially unsound; or with a com-
pany whose management has no understanding of the special business requirements
of the target company; or with a company so large and with such related lines of
business that serious antitrust problems might be raised. Finally, a takeover bid may
be made by a raider or liquidator ....
B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 31, § 27.06(2)(c).
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target's future under the offeror's control. Many shareholders may
decide to sell based simply on the size of the offered premium."9
Alternatively, a target shareholder may choose to retain his shares
for several reasons. He may believe that his investment will be en-
hanced under new management and thus may decide to remain as
a minority shareholder, or accept an interest in the acquiror as the
result of a subsequent merger. 0 On the other hand, the share-
holder may determine that the target's performance will be ad-
versely affected as the result of a successful takeover and that the
offering price is inadequate. Factors relevant to such a determina-
tion could be similar to the economic considerations which incite
management opposition.51
Should the shareholder develop a negative view toward the take-
over, he is faced with a difficult and possibly ineffective choice. If
he believes that the takeover is likely to be successful, he may opt
to tender his stock or sell on the open market. But what if he
wishes to maintain the status quo - to remain a shareholder in
the target as an independent corporation? If a large enough num-
ber of stockholders share this view and have the fortitude to retain
their shares, the tender offer might be defeated. Yet, uncertainty
as to the prospects of success of the takeover may compel share-
holders who would prefer to remain investors in the independent
target corporation to sell and accept the offered premium or the
increase in market price caused by the takeover announcement.
Such a shareholder takes his second, and less satisfactory choice.
In the hope that he will be spared from the horns of this dilemma,
the pensive stock owner must look to target management to mount
a strong opposition.
Other complications arise once a shareholder has determined to
sell. Fundamentally, a divesting shareholder has a choice between
tendering his shares to the offeror and selling them on the open
market. The investor must keep in mind the possibility that more
shares will be tendered than the offeror will purchase, and that
although he wishes to completely disinvest himself he may find
that he continues to own stock in the target company after tender-
ing all of his shares."2 This risk can be avoided by selling on the
49. See Note, supra note 11, at 995.
50. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. See Note, supra note 11, at 996. Section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976) requires that tendered securities be purchased by the
offeror pro rata, according to the number of shares tendered by each shareholder.
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open market in an economic climate enhanced by the presence of
arbitrageurs. 3 However, this decision, as well as the others which
comprise the target shareholder's complicated decisional process,
requires that the stock owner be possessed of accurate information
with regard to the basic elements of the tender offer."
Two societal interests have also been given consideration in re-
viewing the tender offer phenomenon. The first stems from eco-
nomic theory, and represents the belief that tender offers as a
method of corporate acquisition promote economic efficiency and
prevent stagnation through complimentary business combinations
and management substitutions.55 This position, of course, is lim-
ited by the countervailing policies against monopolization embod-
ied in federal antitrust laws." However, even within these limita-
tions, the benefits which flow to society from tender offer
availability continue to be questioned. Tender offerors have been
characterized as financial manipulators who bootstrap acquisitions,
and as raiders who intend to loot the acquired company and to do
so at a bargain price. It has also been argued that takeovers result
in wasted capital which could be better spent on internal improve-
ments and also produce unnecessary concentrations of power.57 Al-
though the tender offer is no longer considered to be a tool solely
of corporate plunderers,5 8 and while it appears that the economic
utility of tender offer availability has received a modicum of ac-
ceptance,5 9 this observation must be tempered by recognition of
53. Arbitrageurs have been defined as:
[M]arket professionals who purchase target shares in the market in order to tender to
the raider, thereby narrowing the spread between the preoffer market price and the
offer price and providing market liquidity at or near the market price for sharehold-
ers who do not wish to wait for, or take the risk of, consummation of the tender offer.
Steinberger, supra note 6, at 608.
54. Note, supra note 11, at 996. A shareholder should, at the very least, know the
identity of the offeror, the number of shares sought by the offeror, the number of shares it
aleady possesses, possible plans to return tendered shares, and the offeror's plans for the
business once acquired. Id.
55. Id. at 997. But see infra note 60.
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
57. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTRIN, supra note 44, at 711-12; Brudney, A Note On
Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTangs L. REv. 609, 626 (1967). In the litigation that
resulted from the bidding war between Mobil and U.S. Steel for Marathon Oil, local unions
of the United Steel Workers argued unsuccessfully in an amicus brief that U.S. Steel should
employ its assets to modernize its steel production facilities rather than purchase an oil
company. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 n.1 (6th Cir. 1981).
58. See Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CAsE W.
REs. L. REV. 882, 885-86 (1978).
59. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1171, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813-14.
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this technique's potential abuses, and by indications that in many
cases the tender offer produces few or no beneficial economic
results.60
To be balanced against society's interest in promoting economic
efficiency via tender offer availability is the policy of ensuring in-
vestor protection. This policy is exemplified in the Securities Act
of 1933,61 which requires the disclosure of certain information with
respect to the issuance of securities, and in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 6 which regulates most aspects of securities
trading with an end towards ensuring fair and open dealing. It is
this policy of investor protection to which the Williams Act was
intended to respond, yet with a structure which would not unduly
burden the tender offer market and with an objective neutrality to
the interests of individual takeover contestants.
B. The Regulatory Framework
Originally entitled "Protection Against Corporate Raiders," the
initial version of Senator Harrison Williams' bill to regulate tender
offers was introduced in 1965."' The purpose of this proposal was
to ensure that "proud old companies [would not be] reduced to
corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized control with
funds from sources which are unknown in many cases, then sold or
traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot
among themselves."" This protection was to be effectuated
through legislative recognition that the "ultimate responsibility for
60. See Steinbrink, supra note 58, at 886-87:
Opponents of restrictive tender offer regulation would be hardpressed to argue that
the companies involved in the most prominent hostile takeovers in 1976 and 1977
were managed by inefficient executives who needed to be replaced by more competent
managers who could better utilize the productive assets of the target company.
Again, while meaningful data has not been collected and made generally available,
the common belief is that the typical target companies today are successful partici-
pants in their particular fields and are managed by able personnel. The criteria used
in identifying target company candidates thus appear to have become the same crite-
ria, from a business perspective, as those used to select acquisition candidates
generally.
Id. See also Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a
Hostile Tender offer, 60 B.U.L. Rav. 403, 453-58 (1980), where the authors argue that eco-
nomic efficiency is not an important by-product of tender offer activity.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o-3, 78p-78hh (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
63. S. 2731, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., 111 CONG. R c. 28,257-60 (1965). [hereinafter cited
as S. 2731].
64. 111 CONG. Rac. 28,257, 28,257 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
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preventing this kind of industrial sabotage lies with the manage-
ment and the shareholders of the corporation that is so
threatened." 66 Cognizant of the dangers posed to shareholders by
secrecy in tender offer dealings, the bill would have required full
reporting and disclosure to the Securities Exchange Commission
by any person holding five percent of a corporation's outstanding
shares." Senator Williams was confident that:
This proposal would not - to any significant degree - interfere with the
orderly procedures of legitimate business. A tighter disclosure rule would
penalize the raider, rather than the legitimate businessman who would have
nothing to fear from full disclosure. It would also allow the corporations,
their shareholders, and their employees to protect their rightful interests
before it might otherwise be too late."
In 1967, Senator Williams again introduced a proposal for tender
offer reform in a form "substantially revised [from that of] the
original bill.""; In the recognition that tender offer acquisitions
might be economically beneficial, he endeavored to design legisla-
tion which would "balance the scales equally to protect the legiti-
mate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders
without unduly impeding cash takeover bids.""" Investor protec-
tion, the touchstone of this proposal, was to be accomplished
through "full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders
while at the same time providing the offeror and management
equal opportunity to fairly present their case."7 Although the bill
emphasized the need of shareholders for adequate information
with which to make investment decisions, Senator Williams did
not disregard target management's responsibility to its stock own-
ers in tender offer situations. Indeed, the bill was intended to pro-
vide information to the target corporation as well as its sharehold-
ers. In a statement made immediately preceding Senate passage of
the bill, the Senator declared that full disclosure "is the only way
that corporations, their shareholders and potential investors can
adequately evaluate a tender offer or the possible effects of a
65. Id. at 28,258.
66. S. 2731, supra note 63, at 28,259-60.
67. 111 CONG. Rzc. 28,257, 28,258 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams). In his proposal,
Senator Williams showed particular concern for the employees of the target corporation
based on a New York Stock Exchange estimation that three-quarters of the shareholders of
public corporations own stock in the companies that employ them. Id. at 28,258.
68. 113 CONG. REc. 854, 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 854-55.
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change in substantial shareholdings."7 Obviously, target manage-
ment participation in the tender offer decisional process was antic-
ipated and encouraged. The important question, and one not
clearly answered by the legislative history of the Williams Act, is
the permissible extent of management's involvement.
In search of an answer, one must turn to the language of the Act
itself, specifically section 14(e).72 This section contains the Act's
basic disclosure and antifraud provisions, and makes it unlawful
for persons to make material misstatements of fact, or to omit any
fact necessary to make statements made not materially misleading,
or to engage in any "fradulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices in connection with any tender offer" or solicitation
against it.7 8 There are two categories of prohibition in section
14(e). The first prohibits false statements, half truths, and material
omissions, and the other prohibits fraudulent, deceptive or manip-
ulative acts or practices.
The extent to which management may intervene in the takeover
process, and thus the legality of lock-up agreements made between
target management and a friendly bidder in response to a hostile
takeover attempt, is the concern of this latter category. The spe-
cific question with regard to lock-up mechanisms is whether they
are "manipulative" within the meaning of the Act. Again, the an-
swer is not at all clear.
Section 14(e) is patterned after SEC Rule 10b-5 7 and it has
been held that the effect of section 14(e) is to apply Rule 10b-5 to
tender offers.76 Section 14(e) is also similar to SEC Rule 14a-9
7 1
71. 113 CONG. REc. 24,662, 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)(1976).
73. Id. See supra note 14.
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) provides:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
75. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969), stating: "The second prong of the amendment is § 14(e). In effect this applies Rule
10b-5 both to the offeror and to the opposition - very likely, except perhaps for any bear-
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and courts have compared tender offers to proxy contests in assess-
ing the materiality of misstatements and omissions in public state-
ments made in connection with the two.7 These rules apply partic-
ularly to false or misleading statements, material omissions, and
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
Similarly, the legislative history of the Williams Act indicates
that its purpose is to provide full and fair disclosure, 8 leading one
to believe that the concepts of fraud, deceit, and manipulation re-
fer to improper disclosures or failure to disclose when a duty to do
so exists. Following this line of analysis, it has been argued that
actions taken in connection with tender offers cannot be termed
"manipulative" where complete and accurate disclosure with re-
gard to those acts is made.79 In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,80
this position was rejected, and a lock-up arrangement ultimately
was held to be manipulative. In order to discover the definition of
the term "manipulative" and to decide whether it includes lock-up
agreements within its scope, an in-depth review and analysis of the
Marathon opinion is appropriate at this point.
C. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.
The Marathon case arose when, on October 30, 1981, Mobil Cor-
poration announced a tender offer to purchase up to forty million
shares of Marathon Oil Company stock at $85 per share. Mobil's
offer was conditioned upon at least thirty million shares being ten-
ing it may have on the issue of standing, only a codification of existing case law." Id. at 940-
41.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1982) provides in part:
False or misleading statements.
(a) No solicitations subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any niaterial
fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any
earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting
or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
Id.
77. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 945 (2d
Cir. 1969).
78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), the defendants,
target management, raised this argument with respect to fully disclosed lock-up measures
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dered, and was made for the stated purpose of enabling Mobil,
upon completion of the offer, to acquire all of the remaining out-
standing Marathon shares. This was to be accomplished through a
merger and/or exchange offer, pursuant to which the remaining
Marathon shareholders would receive in exchange for each of their
shares, thirty-year sinking fund Mobil debentures having, at the
time the principal terms of the debentures were to be fixed, a value
substantially equivalent to $85 per share on a fully distributed
basis."
On October 31, 1981, the Board of Directors of Marathon deter-
mined that the Mobil offer was grossly inadequate and not in the
best interest of the company or its shareholders, and recommended
that Marathon shareholders reject the offer.82 The directors deter-
mined that they would consider other alternatives to the Mobil of-
fer, including the possibility of finding a white knight. Marathon
officials held discussions with a number of companies regarding
this friendly merger option, and ultimately entered negotiations
with United States Steel Corporation. On November 18, 1981, the
Board of Directors of U.S. Steel made an offer to Marathon con-
81. Combined Marathon Proxy Statement and U.S. Steel Prospectus 8 (issued Feb. 8,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Marathon Proxy Statement].
82. Id. The Board of Directors of Marathon considered the following factors in deter-
mining that the original Mobil offer was not in the best interest of the company or its
shareholders:
1. The opinion of First Boston [Marathon's independent financial advisor] that
the Mobil offer was grossly inadequate from a financial point of view.
2. Presentations by officers of Marathon and by First Boston which focused on,
among other things, the value of the company's oil and gas reserves and other assets,
and the historical and current financial condition, results of operations, assets, liabili-
ties and prospects of the Company.
3. A review by First Boston of prices paid in other transactions for assets of the
kind owned by the company, as well as a number of financial criteria often used in
assessing the adequacy of a tender offer price, including premiums over market price
in a number of tender offers (which included partial offers and offers for all the
shares of a company) and other acquisition transactions in recent years. First Boston
also reviewed the historical market prices and recent trading patterns of the Shares.
4. Current adverse economic, monetary and market conditions.
5. Significant uncertainties relating to the Mobil offer, including major antitrust
and other public policy issues and the substantial likelihood that Federal governmen-
tal authorities would investigate the Mobil offer and that such offer might be subject
to significant delay and might never be consummated.
6. The potential adverse effects on the Company's operations and prospects of
Mobil's stated intention to cause the Company to dispose of certain oil and gas leases
in order to comply with the limitations imposed by Federal law and regulations on
the maximum aggregate acreage subject to Federal leases which may be held in any
one state by any one person and its affiliates.
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tamining the following four essential elements:
(1) A tender offer was to be made by U.S. Steel for a minimum of 30 mil-
lion Marathon Shares at $125 per share;
(2) A merger was to be submitted for the approval of [Marathon] share-
holders subsequent to the successful completion of the tender offer. Share-
holders would receive in this merger $100 principal amount of 12-year 12-
/2 % notes of U.S. Steel for each remaining Share;
83
(3) U.S. Steel would be granted an option to purchase up to 10 million
Marathon Common Shares from [Marathon] at $90 per share;8
(4) U.S. Steel would be granted an option to purchase [Marathon's] inter-
est in the Yates [Oil] Field for $2.8 billion, the option to be exercisable only
if a company other than U.S. Steel obtained more than 50% of the [Mara-
thon] Shares.85
The Marathon directors determined to recommend the U.S. Steel
offer to Marathon shareholders and a formal merger agreement
was executed. U.S. Steel made its tender offer on November 19,
1981.
On November 24, 1981, Mobil brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking to enjoin
the exercise of the options granted to U.S. Steel in the merger
agreement. Mobil alleged that these options served as a lock-up
device designed to defeat the competitive offers of Mobil or third
parties and, as such, were manipulative practices "in connection
with a tender offer" in violation of section 14(e).81 On November
24, 1981, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Marathon and U.S. Steel from taking any action in
connection with the tender offer on the Yates Field option agree-
ment.87 However, on December 7, 1981, Mobil's application for a
83. The merger plan called for the merger of U.S.S. Merger Sub. Inc., an indirect
wholly owned subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation, into Marathon, following which
Marathon would be an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation.
Id. at 1.
84. The 10 million shares of Marathon common stock upon which U.S. Steel was to be
granted an option were authorized but unissued shares representing approximately 17% of
Marathon's outstanding shares. 669 F.2d at 367. Prior to such an issuance a total of
58,685,906 shares of Marathon stock were outstanding. Id. at 375.
85. Marathon Proxy Statement, supra note 81, at 4 (footnotes added). Marathon held
a 48% interest in oil and mineral rights in the Yates Field. The Yates Field is located in
Pecos County, Texas and is one of the most productive oil fields in the world. 669 F.2d at
367.
86. 669 F.2d at 368. Mobil also alleged that Marathon had failed to provide material
information concerning the purpose of the options to its shareholders in violation of § 14(e),
that Marathon had breached its fiduciary duties, and that the agreement violated various
Ohio state laws. Id. The court of appeals did not consider these issues. Id. at 369 n.3.
87. Id. at 368-69. Following this order, Mobil amended its tender offer to provide for
the purchase of 30 million Marathon shares at $126 per share, subject to the consideration
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preliminary injunction was denied by the trial court which held
that Mobil had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of its case. 8 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, invalidated the stock and Yates Field options,
and ordered that the U.S. Steel tender offer be kept open for a
reasonable time without the inhibiting effect of the options. 9
In the opinion, the court observed that the mere allegation of
unfair treatment of minority shareholders, breach of corporate
fiduciary duty, or corporate mismanagement would not, standing
alone, constitute a manipulative practice in violation of the Act."'
The term "manipulation," when used in the context of securities
transactions, was viewed as a term of art, connoting practices in-
tended to artificially affect market activity to the point where price
does not reflect the basic forces of supply and demand.91 There-
fore, instead of concentrating on the activities of Marathon's direc-
tors, the court focused on the challenged options themselves.
The options granted to U.S. Steel were found to be expressly
designed for the purpose of artificially affecting market activity by
creating an artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market for
Marathon common shares. The Yates Field was one of Marathon's
most valued assets. The price that Marathon would have received
that the options to U.S. Steel be declared invalid. Id. at 369.
88. Id. at 370.
89. Id. at 377-78. The court first determined that Mobil, as a rival tender offeror, had
an implied cause of action for injunctive relief under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, applying
the test set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Under this test it must be determined
whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted,
whether it was the legislature's intent to create or deny a private cause of action, whether a
private remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, and
whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law. 422 U.S. at 78. The
Marathon court resolved all of these factors in favor of Mobil. The decision qualifies what
was said in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), which held that a defeated
tender offeror did not have a private cause of action for damages against the successful
bidder and the target company merely by reason of the fact that the disappointed bidder
was also a shareholder of the target company. While shareholders do have an implied right
of action under § 14(e), the policies that give rise to it - protection of shareholders of
target corporations - are not served by granting standing to a bidder who holds shares only
as part of a takeover effort. The Marathon court was of the view that the benefits of injunc-
tive relief would enure to all Marathon shareholders, unlike the claim for damages asserted
in Piper. 669 F.2d at 371-72.
90. 669 F.2d at 373-74. The court analogized to Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977), which held that breach of corporate fiduciry duty does not violate § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Section 10(b) contains anti-
manipulation language similar to that of § 14(e). See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying
text.
91. 669 F.2d at 374.
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from U.S. Steel had the option been exercised was $2.8 billion. Yet
there had been evidence produced at trial indicating that the value
of the oil field could have been as high as $3.639 billion. According
to the court, true valuation of the field could only be accomplished
through open market forces, reflected in competitive tender offer
bidding for Marathon shares.9 2
Further, the Yates Field option was only exercisable if control of
Marathon were obtained by someone other than U.S. Steel. Ac-
cording to the court, the effect of this would be to deter anyone
from making competitive tender offers for Marathon because, as-
suming such an offer were successful, the victor would have been
deprived of Marathon's most substantial asset and would have re-
ceived for its money an inadequate return. The effect of the op-
tion, the court concluded, was to place an artificial limit on the
market price of Marathon stock, equal to the $125 per share tender
offer of U.S. Steel."
The stock option to U.S. Steel was also found to be a prohibited
manipulative transaction." The option gave U.S. Steel the right to
purchase ten million Marathon shares at $90 per share. U.S. Steel
had also made a tender offer for thirty million shares at a price of
$125 per share. Mobil, on the other hand, had tendered for forty
million shares at $85 per share. Mobil, therefore, would have had
to acquire the necessary forty million shares at full market price,
while U.S. Steel would only be required to participate at that price
for thirty million shares. The court found that the option pre-
vented all other comers from competing on par with U.S. Steel,
and significantly discouraged competitive bidding for Marathon
stock."' Because the options were found to have a significant effect
on the market for Marathon shares by favoring U.S. Steel's tender
offer and placing an artificial ceiling on the market price for those
shares, the court held the actions to be manipulative practices in
connection with a tender offer, and violative of the Williams Act.96
92. Id. at 375.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 375-76. The court was reviewing an appeal from a denial of a preliminary
injunction, and the precise question to be addressed was whether the plaintiff had made a
showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. However, having determined
that the plaintiff had carried this burden, the court went on to hold that, not only was there
a substantial likelihood that the option agreements violated the Williams Act, the options
did in fact constitute impermissible manipulative practices under the Act, and equitable
relief was fashioned accordingly. Id. at 377.
95. Id. at 376.
96. Id. at 376-77. The court also rejected the argument that because full disclosure
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D. Marathon Analyzed
1. The Relationship Between Section 14(e) and Corporate Fidu-
ciary Principles
Although the Marathon court was quick to recognize that
corporate fiduciary duty is an inappropriate standard by which
management activity is to be measured under section 14(e),9" this
has not always been the rule. Earlier federal courts have reviewed
target management behavior by employing fiduciary concepts
when adjudicating section 14(e) challenges,"8 and commentators
have argued that this is appropriate. 9" Understanding the relation-
ship between common law corporate fiduciary obligations and the
requirements of the Williams Act will provide insight with regard
to the Marathon court's treatment of the lock-up devices em-
ployed in that case.
Within the spectrum of common law fiduciary duty it is widely
recognized that target management has the right, if not the duty,
to oppose takeover offers that are not in the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders. 100 The ability of management to
had been made to Marathon shareholders, there was no violation of the Williams Act, stat-
ing that, although nondisclosure is usually essential to the success of manipulative practices,
disclosure alone does not necessarily mean that there has been no manipulation. Whether
Marathon shareholders knew of and understood the effects of the options on the market,
they were powerless to do anything about it. Id. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, but not significant for purposes of this analysis, the Marathon court went
on to hold that the fact that the directors of Marathon had not violated their fiduciary duty
to Marathon shareholders would not change this result. Marathon had argued that the U.S.
Steel offer had been accepted with the options because the directors had believed that this
was the only way that they could have secured for their shareholders a tender offer share
price of $125. In response, the court stated that the Williams Act prohibited any person
from engaging in manipulative practices, and that U.S. Steel, in making the offer, had en-
gaged in the prohibited conduct. 669 F.2d at 377.
97. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
98. See cases discussed infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text,
99. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 910-13.
100. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. I11. 1969).
One authority questions whether corporate fiduciary duty affirmatively requires target man-
agement to oppose takeovers. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 221-22. How-
ever, a number of cases have indicated that target management does indeed have such a
duty. See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); McPhail v. L. S. Starrett
Co., 257 F.2d 388, 396 (1st Cir. 1958); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168,
1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Cf. Selma-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 114 (S.D. Ohio 1963)




appraise and contest a threatened takeover is a necessary attribute
of corporate leadership. Incumbent management has been recog-
nized as being in the best position to assess the relative advantages
and disadvantages of a change in corporate control.101 Further, tar-
get managers owe a duty of due care to their corporation10 2 and
may be held liable for failure to protect the corporation's interests
when faced with a detrimental acquisitions bid.'10 Corporations are
not created for the primary purpose of becoming takeover pros-
pects, but rather to become profitable through productivity.10 4 As a
result, target management is required to do more than place the
corporation on the auction block as soon as the opportunity to do
so presents itself, for this would be neglectful of interests which
management is obliged to protect. 105
Once a good faith determination that a tender offer is not in the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders has been
made, it has been held that target management may employ all
101. Tender Offers and the Corporate Directors, speech by Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Harold M. Williams, Seventh Annual Securities Regulation Institute,
San Diego, Cal. (Jan. 17, 1980), reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 82,445 [hereinafter cited as Tender Offers Speech].
102. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 234 (2d ed. 1970).
103. While the detrimental effects of a takeover on the target corporation may not be
known for some time after its completion, liability for mismanagement may still exist. E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 221 n.7.
104. In the litigation resulting from the takeover struggle for Marshall Field & Com-
pany, the district court stated:
Corporations in the kind of business as important as that in which Marshall Field
was engaged plan to exist as on-going commercial or merchandising entities. Plaintiffs
appear to believe that large companies like Field are developed for takeovers; and
that seeing to shareholder opportunities for sale of their shares at a premium is the
most important duty of directors who manage publicly owned corporations. Plaintiffs
are mistaken; for if they were not, public equity ownership in corporations would be a
form of entrepreneurial hazard that few corporations could survive.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. 111. 1980), afl'd, 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
105. See Tender Offers Speech, supra note 101, at 82,877-78. In a case addressing an
analogous situation concerning a freezeout merger, the defendants, who included members
of corporate management, argued that they had fulfilled their fiduciary obligation to share-
holders by offering fair value for their shares. In rejecting this contention, the court
observed:
At the core of defendants' contention is the premise that a shareholder's right is ex-
clusively in the value of his investment, not its form. . ..
. • . "Money may well satisfy some or most minority shareholders, but others
may have differing investment goals, tax problems, a belief in the ability of ... man-
agement to make them rich, or even a sentimental attachment to the stock which
leads them to have a different judgment as to the desirability of selling out."
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 & n.8 (Del. 1977) (quoting Jutkowitz v. Bourns,
No. C.A. 000,268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975) (emphasis by the court)).
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lawful devices to oppose the offer.'0 6 In reviewing management re-
sponses for the purpose of determining whether a breach of fiduci-
ary duty has occurred, courts have upheld the use of many defen-
sive measures.1 0 7 However, these same devices have been held
improper where motivated by the desire of management to perpet-
uate itself in office.108 Fiduciary review of the various defensive
tactics centers on the motives of incumbent management who must
justify their activities either as a result of a good faith determina-
tion with respect to the takeover, or based upon some other legiti-
mate business purpose.109
106. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F, Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
107. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (issuance of
additional stock); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). (management's active opposition,
refusal to negotiate with raider, acquisition which created antitrust problems and filing of
antitrust suit held no breach of fiduciary duty); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp.
1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (management filed antitrust suit); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494,
199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960) (repurchase of
shares to prevent detrimental shift in control held no violation of fiduciary obligations). Cf.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 365 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973) (court found no fault with issuance of stock to white knight to facilitate
merger and avert what management considered to be an unfavorable tender offer, stating
that "[sluch a maneuver is a common response to a takeover attempt").
108. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975). Klaus upheld a lower
court finding that the issuance of stock to an employee stock ownership trust constituted a
fiduciary breach because it was for the purpose of defeating the tender offer by diluting
voting strength and was motivated by management's personal interests.
Several federal courts have found a violation of Williams Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1976), by applying fiduciary principles to cases involving various defensive maneuvers.
While the applicability of this standard to § 14(e) has since become questionable, see infra
notes 130-32 and accompanying text, the conclusions that fiduciary obligations were
breached deserve consideration. See Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Royal Indus,, Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 11976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (acquisitions designed to create
antitrust bar to takeover was breach of fiduciary duty); Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo
Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (issuance of stock to defeat hostile tender
offer constitutes breach of fiduciary duty where it serves no valid business purpose).
109. Although several cases have invalidated the use of various defensive tactics, see
supra note 108, careful reading of these cases indicates that it was target management's
improper motive for employing these devices that was objectionable. This distinction was
recognized in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980):
In asking us to uphold the district court's ruling [the appellee] has placed princi-
pal reliance on a series of cases holding that incumbent management may not manip-
ulate the issuance and sale of stock for the sole or primary purpose of retaining con-
trol. . . . Of course, these cases must be read in light of a second group of cases in
which courts have upheld corporate stock transactions intended to affect control,
where the directors have shown that the transactions were entered into for proper
corporate purposes. . . . The cases in this area demonstrate that the courts are sensi-
tive to the risks of self-dealing and abuse which inhere in corporate stock transactions
that are intended to affect control. But at the same time courts have recognized that
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Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.'10 is illustrative. After sev-
eral unsuccessful merger attempts, Condec initiated a tender offer
for control of Lunkenheimer. Lunkenheimer management, being
hostile to the takeover, arranged to sell the corporation's assets to
U.S. Industries Inc. in exchange for U.S. Industries securities."'
The agreement was preceded by the execution of a stock purchase
agreement under which a wholly owned subsidiary of U.S. Indus-
tries would receive 75,000 shares of authorized but unissued
Lunkenheimer common stock in exchange for 75,000 shares of U.S.
Industries stock. This latter transaction was stated as the consider-
ation for the purchase of Lunkenheimer by U.S. Industries." 2
By the time these agreements had been executed, Condec had
purportedly acquired a majority of Lunkenheimer stock. Thereaf-
ter, Condec brought suit challenging Lunkenheimer's stock issu-
ance and arguing that the issuance served no legitimate corporate
purpose but was designed to secure only the personal interests of
Lunkenheimer's present management, that its primary purpose
was to frustrate Condec's control by diluting its percentage of
holdings, and that it was not made in good faith or in the exercise
of sound business judgment. Evidence produced at the trial indi-
cated that a successful Condec offer would likely have resulted in
the ouster of incumbent management, while consummation of the
U.S. Industries takeover would have resulted in no change in
Lunkenheimer leadership. However, there was also testimony of
Lunkenheimer's president that incumbent management had given
consideration to factors other than their own personal interest in
deciding to oppose Condec and favor U.S. Industries.
Lunkenheimer management claimed to have considered Condec's
poor financial status" and to have determined that the U.S. In-
in certain circumstances, it is proper for management to cause the corporation to
enter into such transactions.
Id. at 381-82 (citations and footnote omitted)..
110. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
111. After Condec had attempted to negotiate a merger with Lunkenheimer, but prior
to its announcement of a tender offer for a majority of Lunkenheimer's shares,
Lunkenheimer entered negotitions with Textron, Inc. for the latter to purchase
Lunkenheimer's assets. Prior to the shareholders meeting at which approval of the transac-
tion would have been sought, Condec purportedly acquired a majority interest in
Lunkenheimer as the result of its tender offer, and Textron withdrew its offer. Id. at 357-58,
230 A.2d at 772.
112. Id. at 358, 230 A.2d at 772-73.
113. The president of Lunkenheimer testified that the company had concluded that
Condec's "debt was excessive, its government business disproportionate, and its profit re-
cord low in relation to sales." Id. at 360-61, 230 A.2d at 774.
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dustries proposal was more beneficial to all Lunkenheimer share-
holders and that it possessed tax benefits as well.
The Condec court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and cancelled
the 75,000 shares issued to U.S. Industries, explaining that the pri-
mary purpose of the issuance was to prevent Condec from gaining
control and to ensure the success of U.S. Industries' bid.
Lunkenheimer's evidence was discounted "[i]n view of the haste
with which the basic Lunkenheimer - U.S. Industries transaction
was hammered out."
1 14
The Condec opinion shows sensitivity to the potential for corpo-
rate self-dealing. However, while the court objected to the fact that
Lunkeheimer's stock issuance had as its primary objective the de-
feat of Condec's tender offer, the test which the court employed
does not indicate that such defensive actions are always illegal for
this reason. During the course of its analysis, the court was com-
pelled to determine whether the primary purpose of thwarting the
offer was to protect legitimate business concerns of the corporation
or simply to perpetuate management in office. This approach indi-
cates that where a takeover is found to be not in the best interests
of the corporation, defensive tactics employed solely to defeat an
offer may survive fiduciary examination. 15
Judicial review of target management's response to tender offers
is becoming increasingly stringent as more courts recognize and
give weight to the conflicting interests of management inherent in
the contested takeover. One authority has identified four ap-
proaches with graduated levels of scrutiny which have been devel-
oped in this area, with courts placing increasing reliance upon the
more stringent standards of objectivity and fairness.1 6 With this
heightened recognition of the necessity for careful review of man-
agement activity in hostile tender offer situations, it is not surpris-
ing that lower federal courts began to adopt a fiduciary standard in
Williams Act cases.
114. Id. at 362, 230 A.2d at 775.
115. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 251 & n.108.
116. See Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 60, at 433-34. The first standard which the
authors present is the business judgment rule, which they characterize as "nonexamination
of target director's actions absent a showing of actual fraud or gross overreaching." Id. at
434. The second standard requires courts to subjectively evaluate target management's mo-
tives and is applied with varying amounts of stringency. The third approach is an objective
standard and results in closer scrutiny by the courts. The final standard asserted, borrowed
from the law of freezeout mergers, is the most demanding and involves complex reevaluation
of the fairness of target management conduct. This latter standard, the authors assert, has
been impliedly accepted in recent corporate control decisions. Id.
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Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co. 1 ' is apparently the first case to indi-
cate that breaches of fiduciary duty would amount to a violation of
section 14(e). The case involved the validity of measures employed
by the Anaconda Company in opposition to an exchange offer
made by the Crane Company, and the district court inferred in its
opinion that acquisitions by a target company designed primarily
to create an antitrust block to a takeover attempt would be viola-
tive of the Williams Act.' This result was obtained in Royal In-
dustries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries, Inc.,"' where the court, ap-
plying a fiduciary standard under section 14(e), enjoined a target
company from making such an acquisition.
One of the most frequently cited examples of the application of
fiduciary analysis to section 14(e) challenges is Applied Digital
Data Systems v. Milgo Electronic Corp.12 0 In that case, Applied
Digital, after an unsuccessful merger attempt, made an exchange
offer to Milgo's shareholders. Milgo's management, being opposed
to the takeover, agreed to sell to Racal Electronics Limited 312,000
shares of authorized but unissued stock, which represented 15.5%
of Milgo's total common stock. Coupled with the 6.5% stock own-
ership of Milgo management, this sale would have placed over 20%
ownership into the hands of parties hostile to the takeover, thus
decreasing the probability of success of the Applied Digital offer.
In an action to enjoin the proposed sale, the district court held
that a violation of corporate fiduciary duty would suffice to state a
cause of action under section 14(e), and that the plaintiff had
made a sufficient showing, for purposes of preliminary injunctive
relief, that there was no valid business purpose for the stock trans-




In rendering its decision in Milgo, the court relied heavily on the
Second Circuit decision in Green v. Sante Fe Industries, Inc.,1
22
which held that a breach of fiduciary duty by a majority of stock-
holders could give rise to a cause of action under SEC Rule 10b-
5.12s In 1977, after the Milgo opinion was handed down, the Su-
117. 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
118. Id. at 1219-20.
119. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976).
120. 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
121. Id. at 1157-58.
122. Id. at 1157. Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd,
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
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preme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Green.
Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 2 " arose when Sante Fe In-
dustries, which possessed 95% of the stock of Kirby Lumber Cor-
poration, sought to gain 100% control through the use of Delaware
short form merger procedures. After the merger became effective,
minority shareholders brought suit and, as understood by the dis-
trict court, alleged in part that the merger lacked a justifiable busi-
ness purpose and as such was a breach of fiduciary duty in viola-
tion of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 12 5 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
Following dismissal by the district court, the Second Circuit re-
versed, holding that the shareholders' complaint stated a cause of
action under Rule 10b-5.12s On appeal, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed, ruling that breaches of fiduciary duty were not intended to
fall within the purview of the section 10(b) proscription against the
use or employment of any manipulative or deceptive device in con-
nection with securities trading. After reviewing the definition of
"manipulation"'2 7 and reiterating that "the 'fundamental purpose'
of the Act [is one of] implementing 'a philosophy of full disclos-
ure,' "128 the Court reasoned:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to feder-
alize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden. . . . "Corporations are creatures
of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain re-
sponsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern
the internal affairs of the corporation."' 2 9
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Green, the applicabil-
ity of section 14(e) to breaches of fiduciary duty was again at issue
in a shareholder's derivative suit following the Anaconda Company
control struggle. In Altman v. Knight,130 shareholders of Anaconda
challenged the company's acquisition of Walworth Company as
motivated solely to defeat Crane's exchange offer. Relying on
124. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
126. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
127. 430 U.S. at 476-77.
128. Id. at 477-78.
129. Id. at 479 (emphasis by the Court) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
130. 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a discussion of a pre-Green decision re-
lated to this takeover struggle in which fiduciary principles were applied under the Williams
Act, see supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
696 Vol. 21:669
Tender Offers
Green, the district court dismissed plaintiff's section 14(e) claim,
stating that due to the similar purposes of sections 10(b) and 14(e),
breach of fiduciary obligation is an inappropriate standard under
both sections.
31
Altman is in accord with the view of a number of other federal
courts following the Green decision.132 Yet commentators have ex-
pressed displeasure with this result' 33 and have alternatively ar-
gued that some form of federal fiduciary standard should be incor-
porated into the Williams Act legislatively,13 4 or that the standard
continues to exist despite Green.3 5 One resourceful court, appar-
ently desirous of continuing fiduciary inquiry under the securities
laws but constrained by precedent to do so directly, achieved this
goal through indirect employment of fiduciary standards.
Goldberg v. Meridor3 6 involved the transfer of assets and liabili-
ties from a parent corporation to a subsidiary in exchange for addi-
tional stock in the subsidiary. The transaction was attacked in a
shareholder's derivative suit under section 10(b). In effect, the Sec-
ond Circuit ruled in Goldberg that the failure to disclose a breach
of fiduciary duty is itself a violation of federal securities laws.
137
Perhaps the Marathon court's treatment of the term "manipula-
tion" under section 14(e) could be viewed as having been similarly
motivated. The court's application of section 14(e) to the lock-up
measures at issue in that case resulted from an interesting inter-
pretation of precedent and appears to follow from a conception of
131. 431 F. Supp. at 314. The court emphasized that "[tihis is precisely the kind of
claim the Supreme Court in Sante Fe felt should be decided under state corporate law." Id.
132. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. 11, 1982); Redman v.
Grant Found., 460 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F.
Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Halle & Stieglitz, Failor, Ballard, Inc. v. Empress Int'l, Ltd.,
442 F. Supp. 217 (D. Del. 1977). Cf. Klause v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975)
(refused to consider argument that § 14(e) embodies fiduciary standard).
133. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 905-13.
134. See Note, Target Management and Tender Offers: Proposals for Structuring the
Fiduciary Relationship, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 761 (1978).
135. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 908-10.
136. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
137. Judge Meskill in dissent stated:
Those who breach their fiduciary duties seldom disclose their intentions ahead of
time. Yet under the majority's reasoning the failure to inform stockholders of a pro-
posed defalcation gives rise to a cause of action under 10b-5. Thus, the majority has
neatly undone the holdings of Green, Piper and Cort by creating a federal cause of
action for a breach of fiduciary duty that will apply in all cases, save for those rare
instances where the fiduciary denounces himself in advance.
Id. at 225 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other courts have adopted
a position similar to that of Goldberg. See Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273
(9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977).
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the purposes of the Williams Act adopted by those who have ob-
jected to the severance of fiduciary principles from federal securi-
ties regulation.138
2. The Manipulation Concept
Because the term "manipulative" is not defined in either the
Securites Exchange Act or the Williams Act, the Marathon court
looked to several Supreme Court interpretations of the word in
cases arising under section 10(b). In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,'3 9 the Marathon court observed, the Supreme Court
had defined "manipulative" as "virtually a term of art when used
in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by control-
ling or artificially affecting the price of securities."1 ' The Mara-
thon court also noted the language employed in Sante Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green:'4 "The term refers generally to practices such
as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity."' 2
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.'4 3 is exemplary of this
sort of artificial market tinkering. Crane had made an offer to ex-
change Crane stock and debentures totalling $50 in face amount
for each share of Westinghouse Air Brake (WABCO) stock. In an
effort to defeat the offer, WABCO agreed to merge with American
Standard, Inc. Crane's offer was to expire on April 18, and on that
day, American Standard purchased 170,000 shares of WABCO on
the New York Stock Exchange at $49.50 per share. On the same
day it sold i20,000 shares in two private transactions at an average
price of $44.50 per share.""
Crane brought suit alleging market manipulation in violation of
sections 9(a)(2)'"5 and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. The
Second Circuit agreed that unlawful market manipulation had oc-
curred, observing that the effect of American Standard's purchase
and undisclosed resale of such large amounts of WABCO stock was
138. See infra note 176.
139. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
140. 669 F.2d at 374 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
141. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
142. 669 F.2d at 374 (quoting Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)).
143. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
144. Id. at 791. American Standard attempted to explain the sales as an effort to avoid
pooling-of-interest accounting treatment and liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1976). 419 F.2d at 792.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (a)(2) (1976).
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to falsely represent to the public that there was a great demand for
WABCO stock at an increased value. " " The fundamental objection
to the American Standard transactions was that they "inevitably
distorted the market picture and deceived public investors, partic-
ularly the Air Brake shareholders," by concealing the market
American Standard was making in WABCO stock.
147
The Marathon court, in construing section 14(e), was uncon-
cerned by the fact that there had been no deception involved in
the lock-up transactions there at issue.'4 8 Instead, the court fo-
cused on the "artificial means" by which "normal healthy market
activity" had been affected.1 49 Yet, the definitions of "manipula-
tive" quoted from Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder and Green each
contained an element of deception.1 50 More fundamentally, the
Ernst court in its search for the meaning of the word had observed
that section 10(b) was "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive
practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful func-
tion."'61 If this observation applies equally to section 14(e), then
the Marathon opinion missed its mark.
Lock-up arrangements serve useful purposes if it is assumed that
target management participation in a tender offer transaction is
appropriate, for such agreements can be a useful tool in seeking to
protect the corporation and its shareholders from takeover at-
tempts not in their best interests.' 52 In cases in which management
has rejected a takeover proposal, lock-ups can give teeth to the op-
position. 53 Furthermore, in situations in which an unsuitable
tender offer has appeared, management can use lock-ups as incen-
tives for other, more favorable offers. The security attached to an
agreement employing lock-up provisions could entice previously
disinterested parties into the takeover battle and result in a higher
146. 419 F.2d at 792-93.
147. Id. at 793.
148. 669 F.2d at 376. The court was unpersuaded by the observation of the Green
Court concerning § 10(b): "[Tlhe Court repeatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose'
of the [Securities Exchange] Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full
and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a
tangential concern of the statute." Id. (quoting Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
477-78 (1977)).
149. 669 F.2d at 374.
150. See supra text acompanying notes 140-42.
151. 425 U.S. at 204-05 (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)) (em-
phasis added).
152. See supra note 34-42 and accompanying text.
153. Contested tender offers frequently result in higher premiums for the target's
shareholders. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 60, at 461.
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return to target shareholders."" When properly used, the pure
market system requires the availability of lock-ups, not their
elimination.
The Marathon court was also mistaken in characterizing the ef-
fects of lock-up agreements as artificial. Stock exchange prices
which follow the execution of a fully disclosed lock-up are a true
reflection of the underlying transactions between management and
the acquiror. Fully disclosed lock-ups are not executed for the pur-
pose of manipulating the market, but to ensure the success (or fail-
ure) of a takeover by selling to an acquiror various forms of owner-
ship in the target in transactions outside the tender offer
mechanism. These transactions have economic substance, the pri-
mary effect of which is a transfer of property rights. The resultant
market activity simply reflects the substance of the transaction
and is a secondary effect of the transfer of ownership. 55 Investors
who are made aware of these transactions do not object that the
market inaccurately stated the value of target stock. If at all, the
objection is that management has disposed of corporate assets or
rights improperly or unfairly in breach of its fiduciary obligation to
shareholders. The motives of target management are irrelevant for
section 14(e) purposes, for these are fiduciary concerns as well.
156
Some courts and commentators,'57 however, have taken the posi-
tion that management has no right to act in place of the share-
holder who, it is argued, has an unfettered right to decide the fate
of a target by tendering or withholding his shares. This is the heart
of the controversy in this area once the semantic trappings of "ar-
154. Nathan, supra note 9, at 71-72. Mr. Nathan explains:
By inducing a White Knight to make a higher bid, the lock-up acts as the instigator
for a bidding war by which the target shareholders ultimately benefit. The merits of
this argument seem substantiated by the history of four of the most recent and dra-
matic competitive bidding contests: Wheelabrator-Frye and McDermott for Pullman
- Ampco-Pittsburgh and Ogden for Buffalo Forge - United Artists Theatre Circuit
and Dow Jones/Knight-Ridder for UA-Columbia Cablevision - Dupont, Seagram
and Mobil for Conoco. In each of these transactions there was an agreement to issue
stock by the target to a friendly acquiror. Although it is impossible to guess whether
in each case the lock-up was the sine qua ndn for the friendly acquiror's willingness
to engage in a spirited bidding contest, its existence is indicative that it may often be
a useful precursor to such a bidding contest.
Id.
155. The Supreme Court has indicated that the concern of anti-manipulation statutes
is with the prices of securities, not with the assets or capital structure of corporations: "Con-
gress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate
securities prices." Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
156. See id. at 477-78.
157. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 910-13.
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tificial effect" and "manipulation" are stripped away.
3. The Fundamental Policy Dispute
The argument that target shareholders may not be limited in
their investment decisions by defensive tactics of target manage-
ment stems from broad interpretations of the legislative intent un-
derlying the Williams Act. Because the primary purpose of the Act
is to ensure that shareholders will be protected when faced with a
tender offer through full and fair disclosure of the material facts
relating to their investment,158 it is argued that the only way that
shareholders can benefit from this protection is through an auction
for the target corporation.1
5 9
This position finds superficial support in several cases holding
that various state takeover statutes, which tended to favor target
management, were preempted by the Williams Act and created un-
constitutional burdens on interstate commerce. 60 In Great West-
ern United Corp. v. Kidwell, 6' the Fifth Circuit struck down an
Idaho statute which, among other things, imposed on the offeror
filing and waiting requirements more burdensome than those of
the Williams Act, and required a hearing if requested by the target
company. The court's opinion with respect to the preemption issue
tracked two lines of reasoning, each of which were related to the
legislative history of the Williams Amendments. The court first ob-
jected to the Idaho statute for favoring tender offer targets, be-
cause this "tipped the balance" in favor of target companies
against the offeror, in contravention of Congress' intent. 62 The
second objection reflected the court's view that in promulgating
the Act, Congress had adopted a "market approach" to investor
protection rather than a "fiduciary" approach which the Idaho law
was seen to embody. 6 '
The market approach theory is premised on the belief that Con-
gress relied upon individual investor decisions to provide share-
158. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
159. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 911 & n.50.
160. See, e.g., Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979). Cf. Agency Rent-A-Car Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (accepting
market approach theory of Williams Act).
161. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
162. Id. at 1277.
163. Id. at 1279.
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holder protection rather than the judgment of corporate directors
with a fiduciary duty to their shareholders.'1 4 This view of the pur-
pose of the Act rests upon Senate and House Report language to
the effect that the Williams Act "is designed to make the relevant
facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make
their decision."' 68
In Edgar v. Mite Corp.,16 6 the Supreme Court addressed this is-
sue and held an Illinois takeover statute invalid. Justice White,
writing for a strongly bifurcated court, substantially accepted the
views of the Kidwell court with respect to the preemption ques-
tion. He too was concerned that the Illinois law favored target
management by delaying tender offer transactions. 67 Further, Jus-
tice White adopted the market approach theory and maintained
that the Illinois statute, which permitted the Illinois Secretary of
State to pass on the fairness of the takeover offer, conflicted with,
and was preempted by, the Williams Act.' 8
It is difficult to tell for whom Justice White was speaking from
the opinions filed in Mite.1'9 A majority of the Court could only be
mustered to join in that part of the decision holding that the Illi-
nois statute conflicted with the commerce clause. 170 The only other
Justices to specifically address the issue of preemption had strong
reservations as to Justice White's conclusions. Justice Stevens was
not persuaded that Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutral-
ity extended to prohibiting states from providing additional pro-
tection for incumbent management.' 7 ' Justice Powell agreed with
Justice Stevens, and pointed out that states have legitimate inter-
ests in providing extra management protection.'7 He observed
that small, local target companies may be severely disadvantaged
in a takeover struggle because offerors often possess vastly superior
resources. He also maintained that such takeovers might have ad-
verse effects on the target's community as the result of an ac-
164. Id.
165. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Ses. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813.
166. 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
167. Id. at 2638-39.
168. Id. at 2639-40.
169. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice White's opinion
with respect to the preemption issue.
170. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor
joined Justice White in this portion of the opinion.
171. 102 S. Ct. at 2648 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
172. Id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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quiror's transfer of capital, personnel, and equipment to other ar-
eas of the country.1""
Whether the market approach theory is properly applied when
scrutinizing state takeover statutes, use of it in these cases does
not automatically require its application when reviewing target
management activity. The concepts of neutrality and market ap-
proach as expressed in the legislative history of the Williams Act
were never intended to completely deprive management of its abil-
ity to effectively respond to tender offers. The market approach
theory follows from the concept of neutrality and from the goal of
providing information to shareholders with which they can make
investment decisions. Neutrality, however, refers to the legislative
scheme. It was not contemplated that management must remain
neutral. 74 On the contrary, the legislative history of the Act evi-
dences an awareness by its drafters that management had tools of
opposition at its disposal." 5 The neutrality concept came into be-
ing as the result of a desire not to provide management with addi-
tional defensive power as a consequence of tender offer regulation.
The recognition that management has a place in the tender offer
scenario also affects conclusions with respect to the market ap-
proach theory. Certainly, Congress desired to protect shareholders
in their investment decisions. But this was to be accomplished by
making shareholders aware of the facts surrounding decisions with
which shareholders are faced, not by increasing their range of al-
ternatives."' The recognition that management possesses the tools
173. Id. Justice Powell also noted that "[c]ontributions to cultural, charitable and
educational life - both in terms of leadership and financial support - also tend to dimin-
ish when there is a move of corporate headquarters" following a takeover. Id.
174. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
175. At the Senate Hearings on the Williams bill, Professor Samuel L. Hayes, who had
recently completed an empirical study on tender offers, see Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of
Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HAnv. Bus. Rzv., Mar.-Apr. 1967 at 135, stated:
The two major protagonists - the bidder and the defending management - do
not need any additional protection, in our opinion. They have the resources and the
arsenal of moves and countermoves which can adequately protect their interests.
Rather, the investor - who is the subject of these entreaties of both major protago-
nists - is the one who needs a more effective companion, and that is the important
point.
Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership in Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1967).
176. The Supreme Court recognized this in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S.
1 (1977):
The sponsors of this legislation were plainly sensitive to the suggestion that the
measure would favor one side or the other in control contests; however, they made it
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of opposition necessarily embodies an understanding that these
tools will be used in efforts to affect the outcomes of takeover
attempts.
177
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harold M. Wil-
liams, in a speech before the Seventh Annual Securities Regulation
Institute in 1980, pointed out the flaw in taking the market ap-
proach theory too far:
[The] theory is that the market-place should enjoy unhampered control
over the fate of [tender offer] transactions. That is, the shareholders at that
point of time, the presumed owners of the company and beneficiaries of its
endeavors, should have the absolute right to determine whether or not to
accept the offer. As a corollary, it is assumed that shareholders will make
this decision based solely on an appraisal of the economics of the problem
- is the bidder's proposal sufficiently attractive to justify taking the prof-
fered cash, incurring any tax liability, and reinvesting in a new opportunity?
This theory, of course, effectively means that an offer carrying a substantial
premium over market value will - and should - always succeed. 8
This result, of course, is clearly in contravention of the intent of
the Williams Act to avoid tipping the balance in favor of either the
target or offeror,1 7' for it virtually ensures the offer's success. More
fundamental, however, is the harm that would result from elimina-
tion of management intervention from the tender offer process.
Commentators have argued that the target's board of directors is
clear that the legislation was designed solely to get needed information to the inves-
tor, the constant focal point of the committee hearings. Senator Williams articulated
this singleness of purpose even while advocating neutrality: "We have taken extreme
care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the
person making the takeover bids. S. 510 is designed solely to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors."
Id. at 30-31 (quoting 113 CoNG. Rzc. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
177. The idea that shareholders must have the unfettered ability to decide the fate of
a target corporation through exercise of their investment decision stems from the argument
that informing investors Would be a futile act if for some reason they are unable to use this
information. "If.. . shareholders have a right to hear a fair presentation of the material
facts relating to a tender offer, those rights are illusory if a target's management can avoid
liability by disclosing that they intend to deprive or impede the shareholders' opportunity
to consider an offer." Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 911 n.50. Yet the right to be
informed is not illusory simply because the potential exists for management to influence the
outcome of a tender offer. Even where management resists an offer, some choices have to be
made by shareholders. Further, the mere possibility that a choice will have to be made is
enough to require that investors be informed.
The argument that the right to information gives rise to a right to use that information
and make a decision with respect to a tender offer works both ways. Not only were investors
intended to be made informed under the Williams Act, target management was also in-
tended to be a recipient of takeover information. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
178. Tender Offers Speech, supra note 101, at 82,878.
179. See 113 CONG. Rzc. 854, 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
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best suited to assess the relative merits and drawbacks of offers for
their companies, and have suggested that responsible management
participation would best serve the numerous interests affected by
takeover attempts. 180 Indeed, there are situations in which the of-
fer thwarts the desires of shareholders themselves by eliminating
alternatives, causing them to look to management for protection.' s
Further, target managers are better suited to protect interests of
other facets of society, such as employees, suppliers, and the target
company's community. 8 2 Chairman Williams addressed these is-
sues and concluded that the elimination of management involve-
ment would not be sensible:
[T]his theory precludes other than a market value assessment of the corpo-
ration, ignores its responsibilities as an institution and assumes the society
would overlook economic decisions which could substantially affect its wel-
fare. This is simply unrealistic.
Emphasis on market-place acceptability also fails to come to grips with
the legal responsibilities which characterize the corporate form of business.
For example, is it a complete answer to the duties which managers and di-
rectors owe to shareholders to assume that an above market tender offer is
in the shareholders' best interests? One wonders, as a matter of fundamen-
tal fairness, whether the interests of speculators and arbitrageurs, who move
in and out of large positions with little regard to the strengths and weak-
nesses of the underlying enterprise, should be the decisive factor in deter-
mining a corporation's future. . . Although I recognize the essential value
of market-place discipline as a prophylactic against poor management, the
benefits of that discipline are lost if management must behave as if the cor-
poration is continuously on the block..'"
IV. CONCLUSION
If it is assumed that management has a right to take steps in
opposition of a tender offer believed to be not in the best interests
of the corporation or its shareholders, then lock-ups are an effec-
tive means to this end. When fully disclosed, lock-ups are not ma-
nipulative as the term is used in the Williams Act, because lock-up
180. See Steinbrink, supra note 58, at 891-99; Tender Offers Speech, supra note 101,
at 82,879.
181. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. Chairman Williams also expressed
concern for "the interests of the long-term shareholder, who behaves as a corporate owner
- or of the shareholders over time - subordinated to the interests of speculators, who see
profits in betting against the corporation." Tender Offers Speech, supra note 101, at 82,878.
182. Tender Offers Speech, supra note 101, at 82,881. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 2629, 2643 (Powell, J., concurring in part); see also Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081
(10th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that in control struggle corporate officers should consider ef-
fects on employees and public as well as stockholders).
183. Tender Offers Speech, supra note 101, at 82,878.
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arrangements do not have an artificial effect on the securities mar-
ket. Rather, the market price of the target's stock which results
from these transactions is an accurate response to the transfer of
property rights from the corporation to the white knight.
The propriety of management utilization of these devices is a
fiduciary concern, and abuses can be remedied under this stan-
dard. Presently, however, there is no place for fiduciary analysis in
federal securities regulation. If there is a need for federalization of
this standard of corporate review, it is for Congress to. accomplish,
not the judiciary under the guise of tortured interpretation of an
inapplicable statute.
The concept of shareholder democracy embodied in the market
approach theory may continue to lead courts to misapply the Wil-
liams Act. This approach has achieved a modicum of acceptance in
other contexts, although recent expressions of the Supreme Court
in this area are far from conclusive. 84 This uncertainty renders the
prospective effect of Marathon unclear. While several recent courts
have disagreed with the result obtained in Marathon and have
criticized its reasoning as an application of fiduciary analysis,' 8 5
others have accepted its rationale. 86
However, even within those jurisdictions in which Marathon is
accepted, its effect may be limited. Courts have refused its applica-
tion in instances in which measures similar to those employed in
Marathon were at issue.187 In addition, the Marathon court itself
184. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
185. See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,043 (W.D.
Va. Jan. 7, 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
186. In Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Iln. 1982), the court carefully
reviewed Marathon in connection with the sale of a subsidiary corporation by the target of a
tender offer. Although the sale was not a lock-up option and the court held Marathon inap-
plicable, its careful attention to Marathon indicates that it may have been applied had such
a lock-up been present. See also Union Commerce Corp. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.,
No. 82-3147 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 1982).
187. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp. [Current) FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,079
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1983). In Buffalo Forge, Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. made a tender offer for
Forge, which Forge management resisted. A white knight, Ogden Corporation, was found
and Ogden and Forge entered into a merger agreement. Under the terms of the agreement
Ogden purchased 425,000 Forge treasury shares and was granted a one year option to
purchase an additional 143,000 treasury shares. In holding that the agreement was not ma-
nipulative, the court noted that the agreement was not intended to forclose competitive
bidding, and in fact stimulated competition. Id. at 95,141. See also Marshall Field & Co. v.
Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stock purchase agreement and right of first refusal
on division of target company held not violative of Williams Act); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar,
535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (sale of subsidiary did not violate Williams Act).
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did not purport to lay down a rule for decision in all cases involv-
ing lock-ups.188 As a result, courts in the future may be disposed to
uphold many lock-up forms, either from outright rejection of Mar-
athon, or by distinguishing the lock-ups which they are analyzing
from those employed in Marathon.
One thing is certain, however. While lock-ups may pass muster
under section 14(e), corporate managers must remember that their
defensive actions are subject to fiduciary review at the state level.
Whenever the employment of lock-up devices is considered, man-
agement must proceed with caution.
Thomas A. French
188. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 1981).
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